Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko shake hands at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28, 2024 [File: Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin via Reuters] By Mansur Mirovalev Published On 10 Nov 202610 Nov 2026 The Kremlin’s tense relationship with Armenia will be under the spotlight at a security summit in Moscow.

President Vladimir Putin will chair a session of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-dominated post-Soviet military bloc, on Wednesday.

But since February 2024, Armenia’s participation in the bloc has been frozen.

While the membership technically exists, Armenia does not participate in the bloc’s activities, having effectively boycotted it after it lost a war against Azerbaijan.

Yerevan blamed the group for failing to offer meaningful support during the conflict.

Armenia “de facto doesn’t participate in the CSTO’s operations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said last week.

“What happens next will depend on the nature of the discussions within the organisation.” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on November 5 that “our interest in the CSTO has run its course”.

During the 2020 war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region once dominated by ethnic Armenians, the CSTO failed to live up to its core principle.

Service members of the Russian peacekeeping troops stand next to a tank near the border with Armenia, following the signing of a deal to end the military conflict between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenian forces, in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, November 10, 2020 [File: Francesco Brembati/Reuters] Neither Russia nor other member states – Belarus and three Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – deployed troops to aid Armenia, though the CSTO’s charter envisages such aid.

Advertisement Moscow also maintains two military bases in Armenia with thousands of servicemen and border guards.

Azerbaijan, which withdrew from the CSTO in 1999, used new weaponry procured from Russia for billions of dollars.

Baku’s military triumph also relied on Turkish and Israeli-made drones and a revised war playbook that reflected recent breakthroughs in warfare and military technology.

Pashinyan’s anti-Kremlin stance has been a thorn in Moscow’s side since he came to power in 2018 after massive protests against Russia-backed Armenian leaders.

Yerevan is also seeking membership in the European Union.

Armenia’s ‘useful timing’ Moves to strip Armenia of its voting rights in the CSTO amount to “a demonstrative whipping”, Galiya Ibragimova, a Moldova-based expert on Central Asia, told Al Jazeera.

“Considering that the other CSTO nations are more dependent on Russia economically or stick to the, ‘Don’t poke the tiger’ logic, they’ll keep mum or watch how a bad student is being whipped in class,” she said.

The political gauntlet that Armenia – a nation of 3 million coping with the arrival of more than 100,000 people from Nagorno-Karabakh – threw at Moscow reflects a paradigm shift in the former Soviet Union.

“Yerevan’s timing for these steps is very useful as Russia is too busy with its war in Ukraine and is to a large extent weakened by [Western] sanctions and Ukraine’s military strikes on Russian economic infrastructure, as well as a looming recession,” Alisher Ilkhamov, head of the London-based Central Asia Due Diligence think tank, told Al Jazeera.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 became another pivotal moment that appeared to show how ineffective the CSTO was, as none of the member states backed Moscow militarily.

Shortly before the Ukraine war erupted, the CSTO flexed its muscles in January 2022, when Russia sent thousands of peacekeepers to several Kazakh cities following massive street protests.

But Moscow’s reported failures in the Ukraine war turned Russia’s political and military might “into a myth even Russian officials and military believe in – not to mention CSTO member states,” Ibragimova believes.

She said that the Russian weapons CSTO member states can procure are sold as both “discounted” and yet “advanced”, but in reality, “are very old weapons Russia didn’t need”.

Meanwhile, the ex-Soviet nations of Central Asia and the South Caucasus find new formats of military interaction.

One of them is the Turkiye-led Organization of Turkic States, which includes Azerbaijan and three Central Asian nations.

Advertisement In late September, thousands of elite servicemen from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkiye trained in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Caspian shore to seize ships, land paratroopers and use drones to attack and supply ammunition.

They also try regional cooperation.

In October 2025, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan held joint drills.

Moscow also failed to convince Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s economic powerhouse with a population of 37 million, to rejoin the CSTO.

Uzbekistan left the bloc in 1999, rejoined in 2006 and suspended its membership in 2012, preferring the role of an “observer state”.

“And even though Moscow expresses its vexation with the signs of disloyalty from Eurasian nations such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, it is so far only limited by expressing its dissatisfaction verbally,” Ilkhamov said.

“In the near future, Moscow [will be] unable to take decisive steps to bridle the region’s somewhat disloyal nations.” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev tries to “compensate for his steps towards the West with demonstration of loyalty towards Moscow,” Ilkhamov said.

Mirziyoyev has attended the most important date of Moscow’s political calendar – the annual May 9 “Victory Parade” that commemorates the Soviet Union’s decisive role in defeating Nazi Germany.

He also sends Uzbek troops to joint drills with Russia – but also welcomes Western dignitaries such as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who visited Uzbekistan in mid-October.

“No matter how Russian officials hint to Uzbekistan that it would be good to return, it never did,” Ibragimova said.

The only “real” item on the Moscow summit’s agenda is the security situation in Afghanistan, which borders Central Asia, Ruslan Suleymanov, an associate fellow at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, a US-British think tank, told Al Jazeera.

Russian officials have warned this year that up to 23,000 fighters from more than 20 armed groups operate in Afghanistan.

Especially dangerous is ISIL in Khorasan Province (ISKP), which operates in several Afghan provinces.

The group “actively recruits youngsters from Central Asia, especially Tajikistan,” Suleymanov said.

The group’s operations reach far beyond Afghanistan – it claimed responsibility for the 2024 attack on a Moscow concert hall that killed more than 140 people, including five children, and wounded more than 550.

This year, the CSTO states boosted security on the Afghan-Tajik border that spans 1,344km (835 miles).

“That’s why Russia and Central Asian nations take what’s happening in Afghanistan seriously,” Suleymanov said.